ECLAC Warns Latin America Faces Another ‘Lost Decade’

UN agency says regional average GDP growth was just 0.9% between 2014 and 2024, urges countries to prioritise growth

SANTIAGO — July 13, 2026. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has issued a stark warning that the region is at risk of another “lost decade,” urging governments to urgently step up resource mobilisation to avoid falling into a prolonged low-growth trap.

According to ECLAC’s 2025 Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, the region’s average annual GDP growth between 2014 and 2024 was a mere 0.9% – even lower than the levels recorded during the debt crisis of the 1980s. ECLAC projects regional economic growth of between 2.2% and 2.4% for 2025, with a further slowdown to between 2.2% and 2.3% in 2026. Should this forecast materialise, the region would register four consecutive years of low growth of around 2.3%. ECLAC Executive Secretary José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs said that amid global uncertainty and geopolitical tensions, Latin American countries must “prioritise” economic growth. He noted that governments, regardless of their political leaning, must place a high priority on growth, and that Latin America must “restart economic growth from within,” rather than relying solely on improvements in global markets or commodity prices.

The report specifically highlighted that the Caribbean (excluding Guyana) faces an even bleaker outlook, with growth of only 1.8% and 1.7% projected for 2025 and 2026 respectively, weighed down by tourism volatility, high logistics costs, and climate vulnerability. ECLAC warned that without urgent action, Latin America and the Caribbean could face its third “lost decade” since the 1980s. The commission called on countries to strengthen productive development policies and promote a more inclusive and sustainable growth model. However, the outbreak of the Iran war in April 2026 has further intensified economic pressures on the region. ECLAC downgraded Brazil’s 2026 growth forecast to 2% in April, down from 2.3% in 2025. The Middle East conflict has pushed up energy and food prices, eroding household purchasing power and compressing already limited fiscal space.

Analysts point out that the root causes of the region’s prolonged growth weakness lie in low investment rates, sluggish productivity growth, infrastructure gaps, and fragile institutional capacity. ECLAC argues that the current low growth is not merely an economic problem but a development crisis.

El Niño Could Cut Brazil’s Record Coffee Harvest by One-Fifth

Industry association warns extreme heat and erratic rainfall threaten production, though growers are better prepared than in past events

SÃO PAULO — July 13, 2026. The Brazilian Coffee Industry Association (Abic) has warned that the intense heat and erratic rainfall brought by the El Niño phenomenon could slash Brazil’s record expected coffee harvest by as much as one-fifth. Brazil’s National Supply Company (Conab) had previously forecast total production of 66.7 million bags (each weighing 60 kg) of arabica and robusta coffee for this year. Abic Executive Director Celírio Inácio da Silva said: “We are now talking about crop losses of 15% to 20%. In a normal year this might be within expectations, but under the current scenario, it is very bad news.”

Despite the gloomy outlook, coffee growers are better prepared than during previous El Niño events, thanks to technological advances that have produced more climate-resilient crops. Da Silva noted: “We have made significant progress and can now plant and harvest more efficiently.” In recent years, growers have rapidly expanded irrigation systems to bolster resilience against climate risks, investing heavily in such technologies to reduce reliance on increasingly erratic rainfall. Even so, El Niño is still expected to disrupt the biological cycle of the crop, particularly during the flowering period in the second half of 2026. Experts say extreme heat and irregular rainfall could lead to uneven or failed flowering. Wellis Caixeta, coffee procurement manager at the Expocacer cooperative in Minas Gerais state, said: “Uneven maturation creates quality problems and makes harvesting more difficult.”

The 2023–2024 El Niño, combined with heatwaves and irregular rainfall, had already reduced Brazil’s 2024 coffee harvest from the government’s initial forecast of 58.8 million bags to 54.2 million bags. Arabica beans, despite being in a positive biennial cycle, saw production increase by only 0.2%, while conilon productivity fell by 5.9%. Luís Carlos Bastianello, president of Cooabriel, Brazil’s largest conilon coffee cooperative, said that Espírito Santo state – the country’s largest producer of conilon – is also facing erratic weather this year, with longer intervals between rains and more concentrated downpours. Growers in the state fear El Niño could extend dry spells and extreme heat into January 2027, disrupting bean filling. Bastianello pointed out: “High temperatures are the biggest risk for severe crop losses. Conilon metabolism slows above 27°C and stops entirely at 35°C. Damage from heat is often greater than from water shortage itself.” Brazil’s Central Bank Governor Gabriel Galípolo has identified El Niño as one of the important risk factors affecting future inflation trends.

Brazil Launches Multiple Anti-Dumping Investigations Against China

Probes cover welded steel pipes, lactic acid, PET resin, and safety glass, signalling rising trade friction

BRASÍLIA — July 13, 2026. Brazil has recently launched a flurry of anti‑dumping investigations and reviews against a range of products originating from China, covering welded carbon steel pipes, lactic acid and its salts, PET resin, and safety glass for refrigeration equipment – signalling a marked rise in trade tensions between the two countries.

On July 6, 2026, Brazil’s Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX) issued Circular No. 51 of 2026, initiating an anti‑dumping investigation into welded carbon steel pipes imported from China, following a petition filed by Brazilian company Confab Industrial S.A.-Tenaris. The products in question are circular‑section welded steel pipes with a yield strength below 60 ksi and nominal outside diameters ranging from 14 inches (355.6 mm) to 48 inches (1,219.2 mm). The dumping investigation period covers July 2024 to June 2025, while the injury investigation period spans July 2020 to June 2025.

Earlier, on June 29, 2026, SECEX issued Circular No. 48 of 2026, initiating an anti‑dumping investigation into lactic acid and its salts originating from China, following a petition filed by Brazilian company Corbion Produtos Renováveis Ltda. The products fall under Mercosur tariff code 2918.11.00, with the dumping investigation period set from July 2024 to June 2025. On June 17, 2026, Brazil also initiated a changed‑circumstances review of anti‑dumping duties on PET resin with an intrinsic viscosity of 0.70 to 0.88 dl/g originating from China, following applications from Alpek Polyester Pernambuco S.A. and Indorama Venture Polímeros S.A.

In addition, on June 24, 2026, the Executive Management Committee of Brazil’s Foreign Trade Chamber (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 921 of 2026, concluding a second sunset review of anti‑dumping duties on safety glass for refrigeration equipment originating from China. The ruling maintains duties of US$2.74 to US$5.45 per square metre for a period of five years. The products fall under Mercosur tariff code 7007.19.00. Analysts note that Brazil’s intensified use of trade remedies against Chinese products reflects growing pressure on its domestic industries from Chinese imports. The petitioner in the welded steel pipe case, Tenaris, is a globally leading pipe manufacturer, and its Brazilian subsidiary’s filing is considered industry‑representative. As protectionist sentiment rises among Brazilian industries, more Chinese products are expected to face trade investigations in the future.

IMF Managing Director Georgieva to Visit Uruguay on July 30

International Monetary Fund (IMF) Communications Department Director Julie Kozack announced at the regular press briefing on July 9 that IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva will visit Argentina and Uruguay later this month. The Uruguayan government subsequently confirmed that Georgieva will arrive in Montevideo on Thursday, July 30.

The visit comes at the invitation of Uruguay’s Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). According to the official schedule released by the Uruguayan Presidency, Georgieva will hold meetings with President Yamandú Orsi, Minister of Economy and Finance Gabriel Oddone, and Central Bank of Uruguay (BCU) Governor Guillermo Tolosa. Tolosa also serves as Uruguay’s Governor at the IMF.

In addition to high-level government meetings, Georgieva will attend the Annual Economics Conference (Jornadas Anuales de Economía) hosted by the Central Bank of Uruguay, which will take place from July 27 to 30. Her itinerary also includes a discussion with representatives of the private sector.

Technical cooperation is a key backdrop to the visit. According to the Central Bank of Uruguay, the country is currently receiving IMF technical assistance in multiple areas, including “strengthening the fiscal framework, improving tax administration efficiency, refining monetary policy tools, and enhancing balance of payments and national accounts statistics.” The Central Bank stated that “the meetings will help deepen the dialogue between Uruguay and the IMF on the country’s economic priorities, as well as opportunities to further strengthen economic resilience, promote sustainable growth, and foster more inclusive development”.

Notably, this marks the first visit by an IMF Managing Director to Uruguay in 15 years, since the visit of then-Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn in 2011. The Orsi administration took office in March 2025, marking the return of the Frente Amplio coalition to power. In its 2025 Article IV Consultation report, the IMF noted that the new government’s agenda aims to “strike a balance between inclusive growth and macroeconomic stability, promote private investment, and strengthen social protection”.

Georgieva is a Bulgarian economist who has served as IMF Managing Director since 2019 and previously served as CEO of the World Bank. In addition to Uruguay, her Latin American tour also includes Argentina. The 2026 IMF-World Bank Group Annual Meetings will be held in Bangkok, Thailand, from October 12 to 18.

Uruguay Shocked by Quintuple Murder Case, Suspected Drug Gang Revenge Killing

On the morning of July 10, 2026, a shocking quintuple murder occurred in El Monarca, a neighborhood on the outskirts of Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay. Four armed gunmen stormed into a residential home and opened fire indiscriminately, killing five people, including a 14-year-old girl. Uruguayan Interior Minister Carlos Negro stated that the case stemmed from a “long-standing conflict” between two drug-trafficking family gangs.

Perpetrators Disguised as Police, Scene of Carnage

According to police reports, the incident took place around 7:00 a.m. The four attackers arrived at the scene on two motorcycles, wearing helmets and carrying rifles. Three of them climbed over the wall into the yard, shouting “Police!” to deceive the occupants. Once inside, they immediately opened fire. Neighbors reported hearing “more than 20 gunshots.”

Upon arrival, police found four people dead at the scene – one man lying in the yard, one woman dead in a chair, and two other men at the entrance to a bedroom. A 14-year-old girl, struck by multiple bullets, was rushed to the hospital but later died from her injuries. A 54-year-old woman – the mother of three of the male victims – narrowly survived the attack by hiding under several blankets on her bed after sensing danger, hearing only gunshots and screams.

Victim Identities: Members of a Family Drug Trafficking Gang

The five deceased were identified as three brothers (two aged 18 and one aged 28, all with criminal records), a 32-year-old woman (the mother-in-law of one of the brothers), and her 14-year-old daughter. Police confirmed that all victims were members of the “Los Suárez” drug trafficking gang. The gang had previously operated in the Villa Española area of Montevideo and had recently moved to El Monarca.

Gang Revenge: The Los Suárez–Los Albin Rivalry

Police investigations indicate that the case is linked to a long-running territorial dispute between the Los Suárez gang and the “Los Albin” gang over drug sales markets. The two groups have been locked in conflict for years. The killing of 21-year-old Ezequiel Barrios Suárez in November 2023 is considered one of the key events that escalated hostilities between the two sides. Minister Negro noted, “Multiple homicides are not new in Uruguay; they have happened before. This is the result of a series of killings among the same group of people.”

Political Storm: Opposition Calls for Interior Minister’s Resignation

The massacre quickly triggered political fallout. Former Interior Minister Nicolás Martinelli publicly called on President Yamandú Orsi to dismiss current Interior Minister Negro. He wrote on social media: “First the minister forecasts an increase in homicides in the second half of the year, then the president says ‘we’re handling it quite well.’ Within 24 hours, three police officers are shot, and today we have a quintuple murder. Mr. President, is it really that hard to find a minister worthy of this position?”

National Party legislator Sebastián Da Silva said, “Bullets are flying in areas controlled by drug traffickers.” Colorado Party Senator Robert Silva called on the government to take decisive action: “This cannot continue. The government must make decisions and deploy more police officers in these neighborhoods.” Minister Negro responded that police would step up enforcement in key areas and plans to reorganize the Montevideo Police Headquarters.

This quintuple murder is one of the most serious violent incidents in Uruguay since the quadruple murder that occurred in the Maracaná neighborhood of Montevideo in May 2024.

Treinta y Tres Province’s Proposed Cebollatí River Port Sparks Controversy

Project valued at US$20 million faces strong opposition from social organizations on environmental and legal grounds

The government of Uruguay’s eastern Treinta y Tres Province has recently launched a controversial port construction project—the Cebollatí Logistics Hub (Nodo Logístico Cebollatí, NLC). The project aims to leverage the waterways of Laguna Merín to open up a new logistics corridor and reduce agricultural export costs for the region. However, even before construction has begun, it has drawn strong opposition from multiple social organizations over environmental, legal, and social concerns.

Project Background: Leveraging the Laguna Merín Waterway to Open an Eastern Export Corridor

Uruguayan producers have long called for the country to make full use of the natural connection between Laguna Merín and Brazil’s Laguna de los Patos via the Canal San Gonzalo, enabling exports through Rio Grande do Sul in southern Brazil.This vision made substantial progress in January 2023, when then-President Luis Lacalle Pou met with Brazilian President Lula in Montevideo. Lula committed to advancing the dredging of the waterway, while Uruguay undertook to build a new bridge over the Río Yaguarón.However, severe flooding in southern Brazil in early 2024 delayed the project, and the dredging tender was only recently completed.

Against this backdrop, the Treinta y Tres provincial government initiated a land-use change procedure, planning to reclassify approximately 40 hectares of land on the banks of the Cebollatí River—about 8 kilometers from the mouth of Laguna Merín, near La Charqueada—from agricultural to rural industrial use. This site is the proposed location for the Cebollatí Logistics Hub.

Project Plan: Multimodal Hub with Total Investment Reaching US$50 Million

According to project technical documents, the Cebollatí Logistics Hub plans to build a multipurpose inland river port terminal and a supporting logistics industrial park. The core objective is to combine road and water transport for bulk and container cargo, making it a key node on the Laguna Merín waterway.

Initial project investment is US$20 million, with total investment reaching US$50 million upon completion of subsequent phases. The port will feature a reinforced concrete berth dock with an initial length of 60 meters, expandable in stages, dedicated to inland barge operations. Onshore facilities will include container yards (including reefer containers), grain silos with a capacity of 8,000 cubic meters, a 7,110-square-meter timber yard, open and enclosed warehouses, administrative offices, customs facilities, and weighbridges.

The project is expected to create approximately 60 direct jobs and 180 indirect jobs. The logistics hub will primarily serve the transport of rice, grains, forest products, and agricultural, industrial, and mineral materials from the region.

Supporters: Lowering Logistics Costs and Revitalizing the Eastern Economy

Supporters argue that the project will open up a new logistics corridor for Uruguay’s northeastern region, which has long struggled to attract industrial and agricultural investment due to high transport costs. The inland waterway connection will allow Uruguayan products to be exported through Brazil’s Rio Grande and Porto Alegre, enhancing the competitiveness of multiple production sectors. The project will also promote the intensification of agricultural and forestry development across the region.

Opponents: Environmental, Legal, and Social Triple Obstacles

However, the project faces strong opposition from social organizations. On the environmental front, the opposition group “Hue Miri” Assembly released a document stating that the Cebollatí River and Laguna Merín can no longer bear additional load, and that dredging will stir up pollutants from years of accumulated fertilizers and agrochemicals.The project is also located within a UNESCO-recognized biosphere reserve and adjacent to the “Isla del Padre” nature reserve in Rocha province, making it ecologically highly sensitive.

On the legal front, opponents point out that under Decree No. 128/2026, the project site falls within “wetlands of significant environmental importance,” where changes in land use are prohibited.

On the social impact front, the project will directly affect the livelihoods of approximately 100 families (about 400 people) who rely on artisanal fishing. In addition, the project will negatively impact community ecotourism and the recreational spaces of local residents. Opponents also fear that archaeological and historical heritage—including indigenous mounds (Cerritos de Indios), burial sites, places of ancestral memory, and underwater heritage—will be destroyed.

Project Response: Acknowledging Environmental Impact, Committing to Mitigation Measures

In its statements, the project proponent acknowledged that the logistics hub will generate a series of significant environmental impacts requiring mitigation measures and ongoing monitoring.To address the region’s frequent flooding, the project plans extensive earthworks and the construction of embankments to raise the site elevation.At the same time, the project will attract a large volume of heavy truck traffic, increasing accident risks on national and rural roads, as well as combustion emissions and noise and vibration pollution. The proponent also acknowledged that the surrounding environment will shift from a rural agricultural and pastoral landscape to one oriented toward logistics, port, and industrial uses, potentially introducing silos, docks, ships, and other visual elements. However, the proponent believes this could create new visual interest and will not seriously harm traditional tourism activities on nearby Isla del Padre.

Currently, the Treinta y Tres provincial government is advancing the land-use change procedure, and the project proponent has submitted a port construction permit application to the Ministry of Transport and Public Works (MTOP). How to balance economic development against environmental protection will be key to whether the project can ultimately proceed.

Carlos Slim Helú: Latin America’s Richest Person

As a heavyweight in the global business world, Mexican telecom magnate Carlos Slim Helú and his family continued to hold the title of Latin America’s richest person in 2026.

Staggering Wealth: According to the Forbes 2026 Billionaires List, Slim’s net worth reached $125 billion**. In real-time data, this figure even peaked at **$126.1 billion.

Global Ranking: This level of wealth firmly places him among the top 20 richest people in the world in 2026.

Source of Wealth: His fortune primarily stems from his control over telecom giants América Móvil and Telmex, while he also has extensive holdings in Mexico’s infrastructure, consumer goods, mining, and real estate sectors.

Economic Impact: Reports indicate that his personal net worth is equivalent to approximately 6.7% of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP), underscoring his immense influence on the country’s economy.

Death Toll from Venezuela Earthquake Rises to 4,118

Caracas, July 10 (Comprehensive Report)

Jorge Rodríguez, President of Venezuela’s National Assembly, announced via social media on July 10 that the two powerful earthquakes that struck the country on June 24 have now killed 4,118 people and injured 16,740 — a rise of 229 deaths from the previous official toll of 3,889.

Strongest Earthquake in a Century Devastates Central Coast

On the evening of June 24, Venezuela was hit by two earthquakes of magnitude 7 or above within less than a minute. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the first quake registered magnitude 7.2, with its epicenter about 160 kilometers west of the capital Caracas; less than a minute later, a second tremor of magnitude 7.5 struck, both at a shallow depth of 10 kilometers. This is the most powerful earthquake to hit Venezuela in over a century.

The tremors violently shook the country’s densely populated urban areas. The central coastal region bore the brunt of the disaster, with La Guaira State suffering the heaviest damage. More than 138 aftershocks occurred within the first 24 hours. According to the latest official figures, a total of 1,171 aftershocks have been recorded since the main shocks on June 24.

Nearly 18,000 People Left Homeless

As search and rescue efforts continued, the death toll has climbed steadily. Shortly after the quakes, the official toll stood at 32; it rose to 920 on June 26, 1,450 on June 28, exceeded 3,800 in early July, and reached 4,118 by July 10.

Official data also show that 6,462 people have been rescued so far, while 17,907 people remain homeless. A total of 89 temporary shelters have been set up across the country, housing 16,891 people, and 28,836 others have received medical treatment. The earthquakes damaged 856 buildings, of which 190 completely collapsed.

International Aid Arrives

The international community responded swiftly after the disaster. The United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator allocated $15 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund for emergency medical care, temporary shelter, food, drinking water, and other urgent humanitarian aid. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies released 2 million Swiss francs within hours of the quake and launched an emergency appeal for 50 million Swiss francs on June 26.

China delivered its first batch of emergency humanitarian supplies on July 6, including generators, water purification equipment, disinfection units, solar lighting, tents, and blankets. Chinese tents have been distributed to affected families in La Guaira State.

The FIFA Foundation announced on July 11 a $1 million grant to support emergency humanitarian assistance for earthquake victims in Venezuela.

Currently, 30,076 emergency personnel, 29,344 volunteers, and 3,931 foreign rescue workers are involved in disaster response and recovery efforts. The UN estimates that 1.3 million people will need humanitarian aid over the next six months.

Post‑Disaster Challenges Remain

As the earthquake response enters its third week, efforts have shifted from emergency search and rescue to epidemic prevention and medical recovery. In the hard‑hit La Guaira State, controlling the risk of post‑earthquake infectious diseases has become an urgent challenge.

The Venezuelan government has begun advancing reconstruction work, conducting safety assessments of damaged buildings. However, reconstruction needs are immense. Venezuelan authorities have called for the unfreezing of state assets that remain blocked under sanctions to secure rebuilding funds. The UN has appealed to the international community for $296 million to cover relief and reconstruction efforts over the next six months.

US and 12 Countries Jointly Call for “Peaceful Transition” in Colombia

Washington / Bogotá, July 11 (Comprehensive Report)

On July 10, the United States and 12 member states of the “American Shield” alliance issued a joint statement expressing “deep concern” over Colombia’s escalating political crisis and calling on all Colombian parties to ensure a “peaceful, orderly, and transparent” transfer of power.

The statement, released by the U.S. Department of State, read: “We make a firm appeal to all Colombian authorities to act strictly in accordance with the constitution, law, and democratic principles… to ensure a peaceful, orderly, and transparent transition in a manner consistent with the highest standards of the rule of law.” The signatories include Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Political Crisis Deepens

The joint statement comes against the backdrop of a deepening political crisis in Colombia since the second round of the presidential election on June 21. According to the official results published by the National Civil Registry, independent candidate Abelardo de la Espriella of the far‑right political group “Defenders of the Fatherland” won the presidency with approximately 52% of the vote, defeating Iván Cepeida of the ruling “Historical Pact” coalition.

However, incumbent President Gustavo Petro has repeatedly questioned the election results, alleging electoral fraud without providing any substantive evidence. Earlier this week, Petro told parliament: “Abelardo did not win the election.” Colombia’s National Electoral Council and international observers have stated that they found no signs of fraud.

President‑Elect Suspends Transition Process
In response to Petro’s ongoing challenges, President‑elect de la Espriella, who has received public support from U.S. President Trump, earlier this week asked his team to suspend the formal transition process with the Petro government (known in Colombia as the “empalme”), arguing that the current administration is exacerbating political instability.

De la Espriella went further, accusing Petro of attempting a “coup” to prevent the transfer of power. In a video message, he said that Petro and Cepeida are implementing a plan “to cling to power at all costs.”

Meanwhile, Petro has called on his supporters to hold a massive demonstration on July 20—the eve of Colombia’s Independence Day—to protest the election outcome.

Brazil Mediates, Petro Pledges Commitment

Notably, Brazil has played a mediating role in the crisis. On the morning of July 10, President Petro held a telephone conversation with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

The Brazilian presidential palace subsequently issued a statement saying that Petro “reaffirmed his commitment to democracy and a peaceful transition” and that he would step down as scheduled on August 6. Under the constitution, Petro cannot run for re‑election. The new president, de la Espriella, is scheduled to be sworn in on August 7.

First Political Stance by “American Shield” Alliance
The “American Shield” alliance was launched by President Trump in March at a summit of American nations convened in Florida, with the aim of strengthening cooperation against organized crime, illegal immigration, and regional security.

This joint statement marks the first time the alliance has taken a unified stance on the domestic political affairs of a member country. The statement emphasized: “The transition between governments is not a political concession, but a constitutional and institutional obligation.” It also warned that ignoring the official election results “constitutes a serious disregard for the popular will and the principles of the rule of law.”

This public pressure highlights the deep concern of Washington and its allies over Colombia’s political trajectory, and reflects the escalating rivalry between left‑ and right‑wing political forces in Latin America.

Brazil’s Lula Convenes Meeting to Push National Critical Minerals Strategy

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva chaired a ministerial meeting at the Planalto Palace on July 10, focusing on the national critical minerals strategy, aimed at promoting the exploration, processing, and industrialization of strategic minerals such as lithium, rare earths, nickel, and cobalt. Vice President and Minister of Development, Industry, Trade and Services Geraldo Alckmin, and Minister of Mines and Energy Alexandre Silveira attended the meeting.

The meeting comes as the government is pushing forward the National Policy for Critical and Strategic Minerals bill in Congress. The bill has already passed the Chamber of Deputies and is now awaiting Senate approval. However, progress has been hampered by tensions between Lula and Senate President Davi Alcolumbre.

The bill would expand government control over critical minerals, including the creation of a commission directly under the presidency to define priority projects, establish classification criteria, and veto sensitive transactions such as foreign acquisitions of mining assets. The bill also provides 5 billion reais in tax credits between 2030 and 2034 to stimulate the critical minerals supply chain.

The Brazilian government has identified priority minerals including rare earths, lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper, and graphite – essential raw materials for batteries, electric vehicles, electronics, and clean energy generation technologies. Brazil holds the world’s second‑largest rare earth reserves (about 21 million tonnes), second only to China, and also controls 26% of global graphite, over 90% of niobium, 12% of nickel, and 5% of proven lithium reserves.

However, there are internal disagreements over the degree of intervention. Points of contention include the extent of state involvement, the means to stimulate local processing of minerals, and Brazil’s positioning in global supply chains. The private sector fears the bill could increase regulatory uncertainty and scare off investment. The government also acknowledges that the economic viability of different minerals varies, depending on technology, market size, international competitiveness, and their position in the value chain.

Minister Silveira recently made clear that Brazil “under no circumstances” should export unprocessed critical minerals. He stressed that the country’s mineral wealth should drive industrialization, technological innovation, and job creation, not merely raw material exports. The Lula administration has established the National Mining Policy Council to coordinate strategic policies for critical minerals. On the international front, Brazil has signed a joint declaration with Germany to promote research, technological development, and innovation cooperation in critical minerals. The EU is also in talks with Brazil to establish a strategic partnership on critical minerals.