Peruvian Institute of Economics Raises 2026 GDP Growth Forecast to 3.3%

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The Peruvian Institute of Economics (IPE) announced on Thursday during its “2026-2027 Economic Outlook” online seminar that it has raised its 2026 GDP growth forecast for Peru from 2.9% to 3.3%, and its 2027 forecast from 2.8% to 3.4%. The institute attributed the upward revision mainly to private investment expanding at double-digit rates in the first half of this year.

Víctor Fuentes, IPE’s Public Policy Manager, stated during the seminar that private investment is expected to grow 12.8% in 2026 and 11.5% in 2027. This momentum is built on a dual foundation of strengthened business confidence in the new government and sustained high terms of trade – robust global demand for metals will continue to support Peru’s export prices. The IPE also raised its private consumption forecast, projecting 3.6% growth over the next two years, supported by continued formal employment growth driven by private investment expansion.

In the first five months of this year, Peru’s economy had already grown 3.2% year-on-year, primarily driven by 4.6% growth in non-primary activities. The IPE noted that private investment recorded double-digit growth of 14.4% in the January-May period, buoyed by real estate investment, self-construction, mining project advancements, and infrastructure works such as Metro Line 2. Business confidence, which had been in pessimistic territory for two months, returned to optimistic territory in June. The composition of the new Congress is also expected to reduce political instability and frequent official turnover – over the past five years, the average tenure of the Minister of Economy and Finance was just six months.

However, the IPE also clearly identified major risks to economic growth. The most severe threat comes from the coastal El Niño phenomenon (FEN). The Peruvian ENFEN Committee warned between May and June that the probability of a strong El Niño event between July 2026 and early 2027 had risen from 18% to 59%. The IPE estimates that a strong El Niño could reduce GDP growth by 0.7 and 0.8 percentage points in 2026 and 2027, respectively. Without this climate event, Peru’s economy could have grown above 4% in both years.

Inflationary pressures represent another major risk. Since the outbreak of the Iran conflict, Peruvian inflation has remained above the Central Reserve Bank’s target range for four consecutive months, mainly driven by rising fuel prices. Fuentes noted that the impact of inflation on private consumption will depend on the duration of the conflict and its effect on energy markets.

Peru’s economy has already been dragged down by declining primary activities. In the first five months of this year, primary activities fell 1.9%, mainly due to contraction in fisheries and related manufacturing. During the first anchovy fishing season in the north-central waters, only 25% of the allocated quota was completed, as fishing was suspended to avoid endangering the sustainability of marine resources.

The economic outlook seminar featured Nicolás Etrovich, Latin American economist at Morgan Stanley, as a guest commentator. IPE senior economist Paola Herrera served as moderator. The IPE also noted that without considering extraordinary revenues from mining, Peru’s fiscal deficit would approach 3% of GDP, exceeding the targets set for 2026 and 2027.

Global Shipping Costs Double, Disrupting Latin American Trade, as Peruvian Avocado Market Faces Transformation

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Since late 2025, global shipping costs have surged dramatically, causing widespread disruption to import and export trade across Latin America. Freight rates for shipping a 40-foot container from Asia to Latin America have doubled from approximately US$2,213 in 2025 to about US$4,530 as of early July 2026. Some routes have seen even more staggering increases – quotes for a 40-foot container from India’s Jawaharlal Nehru Port to Brazil’s Santos Port have reached approximately US$9,000. Vessel load factors on Asia-Latin America routes are approaching 98%, with severe capacity tightness, frequent space shortages, and cargo rollovers.

The sharp rise in shipping costs is reshaping agricultural export patterns across the region, with Peru’s avocado industry bearing the brunt. As the world’s largest avocado exporter, Peru supplies 85% to 90% of Europe’s avocado market. From January to May 2026, Peruvian avocado exports reached US$795.7 million, with shipment volumes of 406.5 million kilograms. However, the freight surge is eroding exporters’ profit margins. Peruvian agricultural exporters are facing severe logistical challenges – tight container space, sharply rising spot rates, and increased delay risks, all of which could affect product quality and profitability.

Meanwhile, avocado prices in the European market continue to face downward pressure. In week 22 of 2026, the European reference price for Hass avocados size 18 stood at €8.89 per 4kg package, down 21% from the same period last year. Heavy arrivals of Peruvian avocados, coupled with smaller supplies from Mexico and South Africa, have kept prices under pressure throughout June. Industry observers expect July to be a turning point for market dynamics.

Peru’s avocado sector is actively responding to this dual challenge. On one hand, exporters are seeking market diversification. In 2026, Peru plans to increase Hass avocado exports to South Korea by approximately 14%, positioning South Korea as a priority Asian market. However, freight, fertilizer, and fuel costs on the Peru-Asia route remain high, meaning that even with higher export volumes, euro-denominated export prices may stay elevated.

On the other hand, the industry is accelerating product processing upgrades. From January to April 2026, Peruvian frozen avocado exports grew 14% in volume and 32% in value, with per-pound prices commanding a US$0.34 premium over fresh avocado exports. This trend indicates that Peru’s avocado industry is shifting from purely fresh fruit exports toward higher-value processed products.

A DHL report notes that the Latin American freight market is grappling with demand growing faster than logistics capacity expansion, entering a peak-season-like high-pressure environment earlier than usual. In May, Latin American airfreight volumes rose 20% year-on-year, with average rates increasing 27%. Major shipping lines such as Maersk have already announced peak season surcharges of US$1,000 per container on Far East-Latin America routes.

The travails of Peruvian avocados are but a microcosm of the challenges facing agricultural exporters across Latin America. From Chilean cherries to Ecuadorian bananas, perishable agricultural exports across the region are under the twin pressures of rising transport costs and capacity constraints. Analysts point out that with shipping costs unlikely to retreat in the near term, Latin American exporters must accelerate supply chain optimization, market diversification, and product upgrading to maintain competitiveness in global markets.

U.S. Announces 25% Tariffs on Certain Brazilian Imports

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On July 15, local time, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), under the direction of President Trump, announced that Trade Representative Greer is taking final action under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose 25 percent tariffs on certain goods from Brazil. The tariff measures are scheduled to take effect on July 22.

In a statement, the USTR said the action follows a year‑long investigation that concluded that Brazil’s policies and practices in digital trade and electronic payment services, unfair and preferential tariffs, anti‑corruption interference, intellectual property protection, ethanol market access, and illegal deforestation are unreasonable and burden or restrict U.S. farmers, workers, innovators, and exporters. The USTR held two hearings on the investigation, received more than 360 public comments, and conducted extensive negotiations with the Brazilian government.

Greer said the decision was necessary to address unfair trade practices and ensure that American workers and businesses can compete on a level playing field. While extensive negotiations over the past year failed to resolve the issues, the U.S. remains open to continuing talks with Brazil.

The U.S. tariffs cover thousands of Brazilian products, but exemptions are provided for oil and gas, beef, coffee, oranges and orange juice, aircraft parts, and other products that the U.S. does not produce or that could disrupt supply chains. According to Brazilian media reports, the U.S. ultimately exempted more than 2,000 products. Newly exempted items include pig iron, unsweetened instant coffee, organic honey, aluminum hydroxide, steel scrap, certain seafood, leather, certain wood products, pharmaceutical ingredients, as well as antiques, works of art, and second‑hand clothing. The USTR said these products are important industrial inputs for the U.S. and are either in short domestic supply or difficult to source from alternative countries.

However, not all exemption requests were granted. The U.S. denied applications for agricultural and industrial machinery, clothing, footwear, electrical equipment, garden tools, paper, organic sugar, and a range of manufactured goods.

U.S. Secretary of State Rubio said on social media platform X that the Brazilian government “has not engaged in good‑faith negotiations with the United States.” He accused Brazilian President Lula’s economic policies of “hurting both the U.S. and Brazilian people.”

In response, the Brazilian government issued a strong statement condemning the U.S. decision, calling it “unilateral, illegal, and arbitrary.” President Lula rejected the measures on the same day, saying the unilateral action was “unjustified” and that “Brazil does not recognize the legitimacy of an investigation not supported by multilateral trade rules.” Lula also denied the unfair trade allegations on social media, stressing that according to U.S. government statistics, the U.S. has accumulated a surplus of $424.5 billion in goods and services trade with Brazil over the past 15 years.

The National Confederation of Industry of Brazil said the additional 25 percent tariff exacerbates pressures that are already affecting Brazilian exports, creating greater uncertainty for businesses in both countries. The confederation’s president, Alban, noted that exports from 20 Brazilian states to the U.S. have already declined this year, and the new tariffs are certain to worsen the situation.

The tariff is the latest escalation in U.S. trade policy toward Brazil. In November 2025, the U.S. had lifted the 40 percent tariffs previously imposed on Brazilian beef, coffee, and other goods. Earlier this year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that President Trump’s broad tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act exceeded his authority. The Section 301 tariffs are seen as a new path to bypass the Supreme Court ruling.

Peru Aims to Become a Major Producer of Lithium and Uranium

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Peru is pushing forward with unprecedented efforts to develop its lithium and uranium resources, aiming to go beyond its traditional role as a producer of copper, gold, zinc, silver, and tin, and become a key link in the global critical minerals supply chain.

Earlier this year, the Peruvian government issued a supreme decree officially designating lithium and uranium as strategic national minerals. The decree states that lithium and uranium are core strategic minerals that underpin the global energy transition, the industrialization of new energy vehicles, energy storage systems, and smart city development, with steadily rising geopolitical and economic value worldwide. Peru’s Ministry of Energy and Mines, in coordination with the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation, held the first International Forum on Lithium and Uranium on July 7‑8 in Lima, under the theme “Lithium and Uranium: Energy Pillars for Peru and Global Mining, High‑Tech Industries, and Smart Cities.” Backed by the national decree, the forum served as a core platform for connecting Peru with global capital and technology in the critical minerals sector.

Peru’s Minister of Energy and Mines, Valdir Ayasta Mechaín, said at the forum that Peru cannot be a bystander in the global energy transition; it must become a protagonist. “Our goal is for more companies to invest in these projects, always under strict environmental and social standards, so that Peru’s geological potential translates into more investment, jobs, and sustainable regional development,” said Ayasta. He emphasized that the real challenge lies not only in extracting resources but also in knowledge creation, technology upgrading, and value addition.

Peru’s lithium and uranium resources are concentrated mainly in the Macusani plateau in the Carabaya province of the Puno region, near the border with Bolivia. Currently, there are three key projects in the area: the Falchani and Quelcaya projects focused on lithium, and the Isibilla project focused on uranium. The Falchani project has entered the stage of semi‑detailed environmental impact assessment, and the Quelcaya project has already obtained an environmental permit for exploration.

These projects are held by Canadian‑listed American Lithium through its subsidiaries. Falchani is one of the world’s largest hard‑rock lithium and caesium deposits, and Macusani is the largest undeveloped uranium project in Latin America. Estimates indicate that the Falchani project has proven and indicated resources of approximately 5.53 million tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent. An updated preliminary economic assessment shows a post‑tax net present value of over US$5.11 billion and an internal rate of return of 32 percent. The project is planned to be developed in phases, with an initial annual production of 23,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate and stable‑phase capacity rising to 41,000 tonnes per year, over a mine life of more than 26 years.

The President and Chief Operating Officer of American Lithium said that Peru’s national‑decree recognition of lithium and uranium as strategic minerals is a milestone policy for the country’s mining development, confirming the company’s judgment of the value of Peru’s high‑quality resources.

Analysts point out that traditional lithium resources in South America are highly concentrated in the “lithium triangle” of Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia. Peru had previously lagged behind due to factors such as vague policies and long permitting timelines. The new decree, which simultaneously establishes the strategic status of both lithium and uranium, is expected to attract foreign mining investment, improve the upstream raw material supply chain for lithium‑ion batteries and nuclear power, and reshape the global supply landscape for hard‑rock lithium and uranium. With Lima hosting the 27th World Mining Congress in the second half of this year, Peru is likely to further consolidate its position as a Latin American hub for lithium and uranium resources.

Latin America’s Political Pendulum Accelerates Rightward

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Mexico City, July 15 – By mid‑2026, the political map of Latin America is undergoing a pronounced rightward shift. With right‑wing candidates winning presidential elections this year in Costa Rica, Colombia, and Peru, the region’s years‑long trend of “left‑wing retreat and right‑wing consolidation” has further accelerated.

Electoral victories for the right

On February 1, Laura Fernández of the right‑wing Sovereign People’s Party won Costa Rica’s presidential election. On June 24, far‑right candidate De la Espriella narrowly won the Colombian presidency. That same month, Keiko Fujimori of the right‑wing Popular Force party narrowly prevailed in Peru’s run‑off election. These outcomes extend the trend seen in 2025, when right‑wing parties prevailed in Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras. Since Donald Trump began his second term in 2025, right‑wing camps have won all seven presidential elections held in the region. An article in The Economist observed that Latin America is currently “swinging right at an unprecedented pace.”

Interplay of internal and external factors

Analysts point to a combination of internal difficulties and external interference driving the right‑wing surge.

Internally, many Latin American countries have been plagued by sluggish economic growth and deteriorating public security. Hernando Cepeida, associate professor of history at the National University of Colombia, argues that constrained fiscal space and harsh external economic conditions have prevented some left‑wing governments from fulfilling promises to eradicate poverty and expand social welfare. As voters face rising living costs, they have increasingly turned to right‑wing candidates who promise free‑market reforms. On security, rampant transnational crime, drug trafficking, and gang violence across the region have led right‑wing politicians to champion “iron‑fist” law‑and‑order policies, winning votes from security‑concerned citizens. Yuan Dongzhen, director of the Latin American Studies Center at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, noted that the right‑wing forces that have gained traction in Latin America recently tend to adopt more extreme positions overall, using highly digitalised campaign strategies to precisely appeal to young voters disenchanted with traditional politics.

Externally, since Trump’s return to the White House, the United States has aggressively promoted “Trumpism” in Latin America, openly pursuing a “pro‑right, anti‑left” policy and even directly interfering in some countries’ elections. For example, during Colombia’s presidential race, Trump publicly endorsed De la Espriella multiple times.

Beyond the pendulum effect?

Although alternating left‑right rule has long been a norm in Latin American politics, some research suggests that this collective rightward shift is beginning to transcend the traditional “pendulum effect,” attempting to construct a governance model of authoritarian populism. Nonetheless, others argue that regardless of which wing governs, breaking the development deadlock, responding to popular concerns, and achieving long‑term stable development remain critical challenges for all Latin American countries. As Washington’s bullying practices increasingly lose favour, the “neo‑Monroe Doctrine” is bound to face broader resistance. (End)

Canada Vows to Finalise Mercosur Trade Deal by Year‑End

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Visiting Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand said in São Paulo on July 14 that Canada is determined to conclude a free‑trade agreement with the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) by the end of this year. The announcement comes amid persistent pressure from U.S. protectionist trade policies, highlighting Canada’s strategic move to diversify its trading partners.

Talks accelerating with clear target

Anand made the remarks at a joint press conference with Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira. “We have a firm commitment to reaching an agreement with Mercosur, ideally by the end of the year,” Anand stated. She emphasised Canada’s intention to expand cooperation with partners beyond the United States in the coming decades.

Foreign Minister Vieira disclosed that the two sides have held six rounds of negotiations and made notable progress, though some details remain to be fine‑tuned. Earlier reports indicated that Ottawa is speeding up the negotiating process, aiming to finalise the deal this autumn, with signing possibly in September or October.

U.S. tariff pressure acts as catalyst

Negotiations for a Canada‑Mercosur FTA are not new; they stalled for years. In 2025, driven by the tariff offensive of the Trump administration, both sides returned to the table. U.S. protectionist policies are prompting countries to deepen cross‑border economic ties.

Mercosur comprises Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In 2025, bilateral merchandise trade between Canada and Mercosur reached US$12.6 billion. Estimates suggest that the FTA could cover an economic bloc worth as much as US$4.5 trillion.

Domestic agricultural concerns remain

Despite progress, the deal faces headwinds in Canada. Anand acknowledged domestic worries about potential impacts on Canadian agriculture. Previously, Mercosur and the European Union reached an agreement in January after over 25 years of talks, but fierce opposition from European farmers severely delayed the process. The EU deal took effect provisionally in May but still requires final ratification. Analysts point out that Canadian agricultural stakeholders similarly fear being flooded by cheap imports from major farm producers like Brazil. (End)

Andean Community Meets to Combat Transnational Organised Crime

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The 12th meeting of the High‑Level Working Group on Combating Transnational Organised Crime of the Andean Community (CAN) was held on July 14 in Quito, Ecuador, the bloc’s current pro‑tempore president. The meeting aimed to strengthen operational coordination among member states and promote joint responses to the growing threat of transnational organised crime.

Four‑nation representatives discuss security

Ecuador’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility issued a communiqué stating that representatives from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru attended the meeting in a hybrid format. The session focused on assessing the implementation progress of the first phase of the “Resolution Action Plan” adopted under CAN Resolution 922, and identified priorities for the second phase.

Agustín Fornelli, Ecuador’s Deputy Minister for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, noted in his address that organised crime activities now extend beyond drug trafficking and are linked to other illicit economies, seriously affecting the security, stability, and development of CAN member states. He said these transnational threats require joint, comprehensive, and coordinated responses.

Second phase focuses on four areas

The communiqué indicated that Ecuador proposed to prioritise cooperation in the second phase on combating illegal mining, illicit arms trafficking, human trafficking, and migrant smuggling.

Ecuador’s Foreign Ministry stated that the meeting “reaffirms the CAN’s commitment to strengthening regional cooperation and Andean integration, which are fundamental tools for restoring security, peace, and well‑being for the citizens of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.”

Deepening security cooperation within the CAN

Founded in May 1969, the Andean Community is a major regional economic integration organisation in Latin America, with Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Bolivia as full members. In recent years, as transnational organised crime has become increasingly rampant in the Andean region, security cooperation among CAN members has continued to deepen. This meeting follows the 17th Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas held earlier this month in Peru, as Andean countries continue to coordinate on shared security issues. (End)

Brazil Faces Critical Tariff Deadline with the United States

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Brasília, July 15 – July 15 marks the final deadline set by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) for deciding whether to impose an additional 25% tariff on certain Brazilian goods. As of the eve of the deadline, the Brazilian government had not received any clear signal from Washington. Analysts view the tariff threat as part of Washington’s strategy to “reshuffle” the Western Hemisphere, aiming to bring Brazil onto a new U.S. policy track for Latin America.

25% tariff threat looms

The tariff threat stems from a Section 301 investigation initiated by the USTR against Brazil. The U.S. claims that Brazil engages in “unfair trade practices” concerning the Pix electronic payment system, ethanol tariffs, and illegal deforestation. If imposed, the additional 25% duty would affect a substantial portion of Brazilian exports to the United States.

Negotiations at an impasse

Despite ongoing diplomatic engagement, Brazil and the U.S. have failed to break the deadlock. Obstacles include Brazil’s refusal to concede on the Pix system and Washington’s unwillingness to accept Brazil’s proposed reduction of ethanol tariffs. President Lula da Silva’s administration assessed that reaching a deal before the deadline was “almost impossible.”

On July 15, the Brazilian government issued a statement reiterating that “any imposition of additional tariffs is unfair and not a path to a bilateral agreement.”

Political motives overshadow economic considerations

Paulo Borba Casella, professor of international law at the University of São Paulo, told Agencia Brasil that the U.S. “makes no secret” of the political motivations behind the measure, making agreement even harder. He recalled that Trump once called Brazil an “unpleasant country” and described the tariff threat as a form of “interference in internal affairs.”

Alexandre Pires, professor of international relations at IBMEC‑SP, analysed that the Trump administration is “hardening” its stance against countries that do not align with Washington’s policies, and Brazil is a primary target. “The White House seeks to realign the Western Hemisphere with the United States and distance it from China’s economic and technological influence,” Pires noted, “and Brazil, over the past two decades, has strengthened its ties with China in the face of an increasingly closed traditional partner.”

Brazil prepares countermeasures

It is reported that the Brazilian government is already discussing response options should the tariffs be confirmed. Analysts warn that a 25% duty would severely hit Brazilian small‑ and medium‑sized exporters and could ripple through the stock market, exchange rate, and interest rates. (End)

Colombia’s President-Elect Cuts Peace Commissioner, Multiple Agencies

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Colombia’s President‑Elect Abelardo de la Espriella, in his third national address since being elected, announced on July 13 a major restructuring of the presidential administrative structure, eliminating multiple advisory councils and agencies and abolishing the position of Peace Commissioner. De la Espriella said the move aims to avoid “duplication of functions and waste” and to build a “lean, efficient, results‑oriented” state.

Multiple Agencies Dismantled, 229 Positions Eliminated

Under the reform plan announced by de la Espriella, the agencies to be abolished include the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the Advisory Council on National Reconciliation, and the Presidential Advisory Council on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. In addition, several other presidential offices whose functions overlap with those of line ministries will also be eliminated. The functions of the Unit for the Implementation of the Final Peace Agreement will be transferred to the newly created National Security Commissioner. The Presidential Regional Advisory Council will not be dissolved but will be transformed into a “Regional Administration Bureau” responsible for coordinating relations between the central government and local departments and municipalities.

De la Espriella said the reform would eliminate about 229 positions, saving the government approximately 10 billion pesos (about €2.7 million) in annual fiscal expenditure. The funds saved would be used for “projects that directly benefit the Colombian people.” He emphasised: “I want to transform the structure of the Presidency into an administrative coordination centre, with a lean staff, no ties, no positions used to pay political favours or bureaucratic quotas. This will be a lean, efficient, always results‑oriented structure.”

“No More False Peace Processes”

The most closely watched aspect of the reform is the abolition of the Peace Commissioner position. In his address, de la Espriella made it clear: “The Peace Commissioner will cease to exist, because there will be no more false peace processes in my government.” He announced that, as of his formal inauguration on August 7, the government’s top priority will be “guaranteeing the security of the people and completely eradicating the current prevailing impunity system that feeds criminality.”

At the same time, de la Espriella criticised the “Total Peace” policy promoted by the outgoing government of President Gustavo Petro. He instructed the new National Security Commissioner, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of the Interior to “immediately eradicate, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, all impunity hidden behind the illusion of false peace.”

He also took aim at the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) – the transitional justice mechanism established under the 2016 peace agreement. De la Espriella criticised the JEP for authorising Rodrigo Londoño, alias “Timochenko,” the last leader of the former FARC guerrilla group, to travel to Spain for an event. “The war criminal Timochenko should be sentenced to life imprisonment. I will work for that,” he said.

Reform Sparks Controversy

This reform is one of the most controversial policies announced by de la Espriella since he defeated left‑wing candidate Iván Cepeda in the second‑round vote on June 21. Abolishing the Peace Commissioner means that Colombia will cease political negotiations with illegal armed groups, a move that has drawn concern from international human rights organisations and some international media. Analysts have pointed out that the lack of institutionalised negotiation channels could exacerbate cycles of violence and reduce the likelihood of peaceful resolution of armed conflicts.

Meanwhile, de la Espriella’s plan to hold his inauguration ceremony at a military base in the south has also brought him into direct conflict with current President Petro. Petro has ordered that no military or police facilities be used for the inaugural ceremony, emphasising that the Constitution requires the ceremony to take place in Congress. De la Espriella responded that he would ignore the “opposition of the outgoing government.”

De la Espriella also announced the creation of a digital platform called the “National Talent Bank,” promising that all future public appointments would be based purely on merit and performance, putting an end to “nepotism” and “political favour‑trading.” He also appointed María Nohemí Arboleda, an electrical engineer with 30 years of industry experience, as Minister of Mines and Energy.

The restructuring of the presidential agencies will take effect after de la Espriella is formally inaugurated on August 7.

Venezuela’s Acting President Announces Cabinet Reshuffle, Appoints Veteran Diplomat Félix Plasencia as Foreign Minister

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Venezuela’s Acting President Delcy Rodríguez announced a cabinet reshuffle on July 13, merging the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade into a single Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, and appointing veteran diplomat Félix Plasencia to head the new portfolio. Former Foreign Minister Yván Gil was reassigned to lead the Ministry of Science and Technology.

In a statement posted on social media, Rodríguez said Plasencia possesses “extensive diplomatic experience” and will be responsible for steering Venezuela’s foreign policy, safeguarding national sovereignty, strengthening international cooperation, and promoting “peace diplomacy” globally. Plasencia previously served as Venezuela’s foreign minister from 2021 to 2022, and earlier this year he was entrusted by Rodríguez as head of the Venezuelan diplomatic mission in the United States. He has also held posts as ambassador to the United Kingdom, China, Colombia, and served as executive secretary of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA-TCP).

Under the reshuffle, the newly created Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade combines the previous separate foreign and trade portfolios. This merger resulted in the departure of former Foreign Trade Minister Johann Álvarez. Rodríguez said integrating diplomatic and trade functions into one department is intended to more effectively coordinate Venezuela’s foreign policy and international economic cooperation.

Meanwhile, former Foreign Minister Yván Gil was appointed Minister of Science and Technology. Rodríguez said Gil will be tasked with “continuing to drive scientific development, innovation, and technological transformation” in service of the Venezuelan people and national development. Gil holds a bachelor’s and master’s degree in agricultural engineering from the Central University of Venezuela, and a doctorate in biological and industrial sciences and technology from the University of Montpellier in France. The outgoing science and technology minister, biologist Gabriela Jiménez, left the post.

In addition, on July 14, Rodríguez named former Foreign Trade Minister Johann Álvarez as Venezuela’s new chargé d’affaires in the United States. She said Álvarez will bear the “strategic mission of representing national interests and leading a new phase of dialogue and cooperation.”

The cabinet shake-up comes as Venezuela faces multiple challenges. Last month, the country’s coastal region was hit by two successive strong earthquakes, causing heavy casualties and material damage. National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez reported that the quakes have killed at least 4,561 people and injured 16,740. At the same time, Venezuela and the United States are seeking to enter a “new phase of dialogue and cooperation,” having resumed diplomatic relations earlier this year after a break since 2019.

On the economic front, Rodríguez previously announced that Venezuela’s oil production has recovered to 1.2 million barrels per day, and that the earthquakes did not affect output. According to the Central Bank of Venezuela, oil export revenues in the first quarter of 2026 rose 21 percent year-on-year to $5.491 billion.